We prove that the support of mixed strategy equilibria of two-player, symmetric, zero-sum games lies in the uncovered set, a concept originating in the theory of tournaments and the spatial theory of politics. We allow for uncountably in…nite strategy spaces, and, as a special case, we obtain a longstanding claim to the same e¤ect, due to McKelvey (1986) , in the political science literature. Further, we prove the non-emptiness of the uncovered set under quite general assumptions, and we establish, under various assumptions, the measurability and coanalyticity of this set. In the concluding section, we indicate how the inclusion result may be extended to multi-player, non-zero-sum games.
Introduction
A common conclusion drawn from work on the multi-dimensional spatial model of elections is that, typically, anything can happen (Riker (1980) ). One strand of work has established that the core, consisting of alternatives unbeaten in pairwise majority comparisons, is generically empty; 1 another, assuming the core is empty, has deduced the existence of a global cycle. 2 The situation facing two o¢ce-motivated parties might appear, therefore, to be quite indeterminate: from the former strand of work, we know that pure strategy Nash equilibria of the party competition game rarely exist; and from the latter strand, every policy alternative is typically rationalizable. In a seminal paper, McKelvey (1986) claimed to the contrary that the support of mixed strategy equilibria of the game, if they exist, will lie in a centrally located region of the policy space called the "uncovered set." He suggested, moreover, that the uncovered set will collapse, in a continuous way, to the core when it is non-empty; Cox (1987) proved this for an odd number of voters, and Banks, Duggan, and Le extend the result to a continuum of voters. Thus, the analysis of the uncovered set tells us that equilibrium outcomes will be "close" to the core when the core is "close" to non-empty.
The uncovered set was de…ned originally by Fishburn (1979) and Miller (1980) and axiomatized by Moulin (1986) in the context of tournaments, i.e., binary relations representing majority preferences of a society over a …nite set of policy alternatives. Fisher and Ryan (1991) and La¤ond, Laslier, and Le Breton (1993) independently proved that, in the absence of majority-ties, the party competition game has a unique mixed strategy equilibrium and that the support of the agents' strategies lies in the uncovered set. Recently, Dutta and Laslier (1998) have de…ned the uncovered set in the context of general …nite, two-player, symmetric, zero-sum games, and they have shown that the support of each mixed strategy equilibrium (no longer unique) still lies in the uncovered set. modelled as points in a convex subset of Euclidean space, and majority preferences over social policies are determined by the continuous, strictly convex preferences of a …nite electorate. Payo¤s of the party competition game are, therefore, highly discontinuous, and the existence of mixed strategy equilibria in this model remains an open question. 4 Nonetheless, McKelvey claims that if a mixed strategy equilibrium does exist, the support of the parties' mixed strategies will necessarily lie in the uncovered set. His proof contains a critical error, 5 but we con…rm that the claim is, indeed, true. We frame the problem in the more general context of two-player, symmetric, zero-sum games, allowing for in…nite strategy spaces. By way of introduction, we …rst extend the known inclusion results for the uncovered set to the case of games with countable strategy sets, obtaining the result of Dutta and Laslier (1998) as a special case. We then generalize this to the case of games with continuous payo¤s and possibly uncountable strategy sets. Because of the discontinuities inherent in the spatial model, however, this level of generality is not su¢cient to recover McKelvey's result. We go on to consider games for which the set of strategy pro…les yielding a positive payo¤ is open, a weak continuity condition satis…ed in the party competition game studied in McKelvey (1986) and Banks, Duggan, and Le Breton (1998). We prove, as claimed by McKelvey, that the uncovered set includes the support of all mixed strategy equilibria. We also prove that the uncovered set is non-empty, generalizing another result of McKelvey's and a later result of Bordes, Le Breton, and Salles (1992), and we provide an example showing that the inclusion can fail unless some continuity condition is imposed.
Once uncountable strategy sets are allowed for, a number of interesting technical issues arise. Chief among them, it appears that, even when the payo¤ function of the game is continuous, the uncovered set may be nonmeasurable. To address this di¢culty, we employ the theory of analytic sets, developed by Dellacherie and Meyer (1978) , surveyed by Stinchcombe and White (1992) and, brie ‡y, in the appendix of this paper. We show that, assuming full continuity, the uncovered set is the complement of an analytic set. Assuming only the weak continuity condition above, it appears that not even this much can be said.
Preliminaries
Let X be a set of strategies and u: X £ X ! < be a payo¤ function de…ning a two-player, zero-sum game, (X; u), symmetric in the sense that u(x; y) = ¡u(y; x) for all x; y 2 X. Throughout, X is endowed with a topology (discrete if X is countable) and its Borel ¾-algebra, and u is assumed to be measurable with respect to the product ¾-algebra on X £ X. The party competition game is obtained as the special case,
where P is an asymmetric relation on X representing majority preferences. McKelvey (1986) shows, assuming a …nite electorate, that continuity of voter preferences is su¢cient for P to be open. 6 We do so elsewhere (Banks, Duggan, and Le Breton (1998)) for an arbitrary electorate. The condition that P is open is, in turn, su¢cient for measurability of u. Let ¾ denote a typical mixed strategy, i.e., a Borel probability measure on X, and let ¾ denote the outer measure induced by ¾; that is,
The expected payo¤ (to player 1) from the mixed strategy pair (¾; ¾ 0 ) is
or, by Fubini's theorem,
where ¾ £ ¾ is the product measure induced by the mixed strategies. The pair (¾; ¾ 0 ) constitutes a Nash equilibrium if, for all mixed strategies3, the following inequalities hold:
It is clear that, if (¾; ¾ 0 ) is a Nash equilibrium, neither ¾ nor ¾ 0 can put positive probability on the set of strictly dominated strategy pro…les. We pursue a tighter bound on the support of mixed strategy equilibria. Our analysis employs the following binary relations on X.
xDy (8z 2 X; u(x; z)¸u(y; z)) & (9z 2 X; u(x; z) > u(y; z))
Here, D is the usual notion of weak dominance; M is the Miller relation, introduced by Miller (1980) in the context of majority voting; G is the Gillies relation, introduced by Gillies (1959) in his analysis of zero-sum games and proposed by Fishburn (1979) in the context of majority voting; and C is the covering relation, de…ned by McKelvey (1986) in the context of the spatial voting model. Note that M and G are generally stronger than C, and that the relations are equivalent in the majority voting model without ties (i.e., x 6 = y implies u(x; y) 2 f1; ¡1g). Each of the relations de…ned above is a strict partial order and, if X is …nite, it follows that each possesses maximal elements. In Section 4, we give general conditions su¢cient for the existence of G-maximal, and therefore C-maximal, strategies. The rationalizable strategies of Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984) give bounds on the support of mixed strategy equilibria. As the next examples show, there is no general inclusion relation between this set and the maximal strategies of the above relations. Payo¤s are given for the row player. Example 1. Here, xCz but z is rationalizable as a best response to y, which is a best response to w, which is a best response to z.
[ Figure 1 here.] Example 2. Here, x is C-maximal but strictly dominated for the row player by the mixed strategy (0; 1=2; 1=2), and therefore it is not rationalizable.
[ Figure 2 here.] See Duggan and Le for an example of the majority voting model in which a C-maximal strategy is not rationalizable. Thus, the conclusion of Example 2 carries over to this important special case of games.
Duggan and Le Breton show, however, that, in the absence of ties, the C-maximal strategies are always rationalizable.
As in Examples 3 and 4, below, weakly dominated strategies may be played with positive probability in equilibrium. Moreover, they show that the sets of M-and G-maximal elements are too small to bound the support of mixed strategy equilibria, even in the majority voting model. Example 3. Let X = fx; y; zg with payo¤s below. Note that ((0; 1=2; 1=2), (0; 1=2; 1=2)) is a Nash equilibrium, but xMy.
[ Figure 3 here.] Example 4. Let X = fx; y; z; wg with payo¤s below. Note that ((0; 1=3; 1=3, 1=3); (0; 1=3; 1=3; 1=3)) is a Nash equilibrium, but xGy.
[ Figure 4 here.]
Thus, of the relations introduced above, we focus on the maximal elements of the covering relation for a bound on the support of mixed strategy equilibria. The uncovered set, denoted U , consists of the maximal elements of the covering relation: x 2 U if and only if there is no y 2 X such that yCx. Letting V = X n U denote the set of covered strategies, we can view C: V !! X as a correspondence, with graphC = f(x; y) 2 X £ X j y 2 C(x)g.
In the appendix, we prove a lemma on the measurable structure of graphC and its projection, V . Under the most general assumptions, we can say little; adding continuity of u, graphC is measurable and V is analytic; adding compactness of X, both sets (and therefore U ) are measurable.
Continuous Games
The uncovered set has received much attention in the context of tournaments, including an axiomatic characterization by Moulin (1986); La¤ond, Laslier, and Le Breton (1993) have proved, as a corollary of their result on the minimal covering set, that the support of the unique mixed strategy equilibrium is included in the uncovered set; and Dutta and Laslier (1998) have extended this to …nite, two-player, symmetric, zero-sum games. Our …rst result, mainly illustrative, veri…es the inclusion for countable, two-player, symmetric, zero-sum games. Theorem 1. If X is countable and (¾; ¾ 0 ) is a Nash equilibrium then
Proof. Suppose that ¾(U ) < 1 and note that, by interchangeability, (¾; ¾) is a Nash equilibrium. Since V is countable and ¾(V ) > 0, there exists x 2 V and y 2 C(x) such that ¾(fxg) > 0. Now consider the mixed strategy3 de…ned by3(fyg) = 1. Since u(y; x) > 0 = u(x; x), we have
contradicting the fact that (¾; ¾) is a Nash equilibrium. A symmetric argument addresses the case ¾ 0 (U ) < 1 and completes the proof.
We now extend the arguments in support of Theorem 1 to show that, assuming payo¤ functions are continuous and X is second countable (i.e., the topology on X has a countable base), the supports of Nash equilibria are included within the uncovered set. This increased generality raises two technical challenges: …rst, the set V is analytic but, it appears, may be non-measurable; second, there may no longer be a strategy x 2 V such that ¾(fxg) > 0. Theorem 2. If X is second countable, u is continuous, and (¾; ¾ 0 ) is a Nash equilibrium, then ¾(U ) = ¾ 0 (U ) = 1. If, in addition, X is a complete, separable metric space, then there exists a measurable setÛ µ U such that
Proof. Suppose that ¾(U ) < 1, so there exists a measurable set
Note that, by interchangeability, (¾; ¾) is a Nash equilibrium. LetV be the measurable set consisting of strategies x 2 V 0 such that
and note that, because (¾; ¾) is a Nash equilibrium, ¾(V ) = ¾(V 0 ). For all x 2V and all y 2 C(x), u(y; x) > 0 = u(x; x). Thus, continuity of u yields an open set Z x;y µ X such that x 2 Z x;y and, for all z 2 Z x;y , u(y; z) > u(x; z). Now considerV as a topological space endowed with the relative topology induced by X. This space is second countable and, therefore, Lindelöf: every open cover contains a countable subcover. Since fZ x;y \V j x 2V ; y 2 C(x)g is an open cover of V 0 , it has a countable subcover fZ x k ;y k \V j k = 1; 2; : : :g.
Since ¾(
Then the expected payo¤ from (3; ¾), where3 is de…ned by3(fy k g) = 1, is
where the …rst inequality follows from y k Dx k ; the second from u(y k ; z) > u(x k ; z) for all z 2 Z x k ;y k and ¾(Z x k ;y k ) > 0; and the third from condition (1). This contradicts the presumption that (¾; ¾) is a Nash equilibrium. A symmetric argument addresses the case ¾ 0 (U ) < 1. If X is a complete, separable metric space, then, by Lemma 1, V is analytic. Thus, there are measurable sets Y ¶ V and Z ¶ V such that
, the proof is complete.
By Lemma 1, in the appendix, if X is a compact metric space, U is itself measurable and we can takeÛ = U in the statement of Theorem 2.
Discontinuous Games
Adding compactness of X to the assumptions of Theorem 2, Nash equilibria exist (see Glicksberg (1952) ), and, as a consequence, the uncovered set is non-empty. The next theorem establishes that G-maximal, and therefore uncovered, strategies actually exist under very weak continuity assumptions. This result generalizes McKelvey's (1986) existence theorem, which assumes strict convexity of voter preferences, and it generalizes the result of Bordes, Le Breton, and Salles (1992) by dropping the metric space structure of X and weakening continuity.
Theorem 3. If X is compact and fy 2 X j u(x; y) > 0g is open for all x 2 X, then G-maximal elements exist.
Proof. We …rst de…ne the following (transitive) relations.
Every G ¤ -maximal element is a G-maximal element, so it su¢ces to prove the existence of the former. To this end, let fx ® g be a G ¤ -chain in X. We will show that this chain has a G ¤ -upper bound in X, so that Zorn's lemma yields a G ¤ -maximal element. If fx ® g contains a G ¤ -upper bound, we are done. Therefore, suppose otherwise. By compactness, fx ® g has an accumulation point, say x. We …rst show that x is a G ± -upper bound of fx ® g by taking arbitrary x ® and z 2 X such that u(z; x) > 0. By assumption, there exists an open set Y such that x 2 Y and, for all y 2 Y , u(z; y) > 0. Because x is an accumulation point, there exists
We now show that x is a G ¤ -upper bound, again taking arbitrary x ® . If x ® G ± x then, by transitivity of G ± and the fact that x is a G ± -upper bound of fx ® g, it follows that x ® is a G ± -upper bound. Because fx ® g is a G ¤ -chain, this means that x ® is, in fact, a G ¤ -upper bound, contrary to our initial supposition. Thus, the proof is complete.
Our …nal theorem generalizes the second part of Theorem 2 by substantially weakening continuity. The weaker assumption is clearly satis…ed in the majority voting model when P is open, delivering McKelvey's (1986) stated inclusion result as a special case. The possibility of discontinuous payo¤s adds to the technical challenges of Theorem 2: because we cannot conclude, under the assumptions of the theorem, that graphC is measurable, we do not know that V is even analytic. In the proof, we are forced to approximate graphC from above by an appropriately chosen measurable set. 7 Theorem 4. If X is a complete, separable metric space, f(x; y) 2 X £ X j u(x; y) > 0g is open, and (¾; ¾ 0 ) is a Nash equilibrium, then there exists a measurable setÛ µ U such that ¾(Û ) = ¾ 0 (Û ) = 1.
Proof. By interchangeability, (¾; ¾) and (¾ 0 ; ¾ 0 ) are both Nash equilibria, so we focus on ¾ without loss of generality. De…ne the following two relations on X.
xD ² y ¾(fw 2 X j u(y; w) > u(x; w)g) < ²
Thus, xD ² y if the set of strategies against which y gives a higher payo¤ than x has measure less than ²; xC ² y adds u(x; y) > 0; and xC ¤ y if u(x; y) > 0 and the set of strategies against which y gives a higher payo¤ than x has measure zero. Clearly, xCy implies xC ¤ y, or, alternatively,
, and note that V µ V 0 . We claim that graphC ² , and therefore graphC ¤ , is measurable. Writing ¾(fw 2 X j u(y; w) > u(x; w)g) as Z X Â fwju(y;w)>u(x;w)g (z)¾(dz); this will follow if Â fwju(y;w)>u(x;w)g (z) is a measurable function of x, y, and z. Note that (x; y; z) satis…es Â fwju(y;w)>u(x;w)g (z) = 1 if and only if u(y; z) > u(x; z), so, because u is measurable, these triples comprise a measurable set, …nishing the claim. As a consequence, V 0 is analytic.
Suppose there exists a measurable subsetV µ V Dellacherie and Meyer's (1978) Theorem III.44 (and remarks following) yields a measurable "almost everywhere selection" of (graphC ¤ ) \ (V £ X). That is, there is a measurable function°: X ! X such that, for ¾-almost every x 2V , (x;°(x)) 2 (graphC ¤ ) \ (V £ X). Applying Lusin's theorem (see Rudin (1966) ), there is a measurable subsetṼ µV such that ¾(Ṽ ) > 0 and°is continuous oñ V . De…ne°: X ! X by°(
also a measurable function. Now consider the deviation3 = ¾ ±°, meaning3(Y ) = ¾(°¡ 1 (Y )) for each measurable Y . For all x 2Ṽ , u(°(x); x) > 0, so, using the weak continuity assumption of the theorem, there exists ± x > 0 such that 8w 2 B ±x (x); 8y 2 B ±x (°(x)); u(y; w) > 0:
Because°is continuous onṼ ,°¡
Since
g is an open cover of f(x;°(x)) j x 2Ṽ g. By the Lindelöf property, it has a countable subcover,
: : :g, where we write
Since fB k (x k ) \Ṽ j k = 1; 2; : : :g coversṼ , we have
The above equality follows from the change of variables theorem, and the inequality follows from three observations. First, by symmetry and the assumption that (X; u) is zero-sum,
Second, from (3), we have°(w) 2 B ±x k (°(x k )) for all w 2 B k (x k ); and from (2), this implies that u(°(w); z) > 0 for all w; z 2 B k (x k ); and then
Third, for all x 2Ṽ and ¾-almost every w, u(°(x); w)¸u(x; w). Thus, we have contradicted the presumption that (¾; ¾) is a Nash equilibrium. Therefore, there is no measurable subset of V 0 with positive measure. Because V is covered by x + 1=2, but the strategies de…ned by the uniform probability distribution on [0; 1=2) constitute a Nash equilibrium.
[ Figure 5 here.]
Extensions
Though de…ned in the context of two-player, symmetric, zero-sum games, the covering relation is easily extended to general symmetric games. Let (X; u 1 ; u 2 ) denote a (possibly non-zero-sum) game, symmetric in the sense that u 1 (x; y) = u 2 (y; x) for all x; y 2 X. We modify the de…nition of covering as follows.
xCy u 1 (x; y) > u 1 (y; y) & xDy As with the zero-sum case, the uncovered set is a superset of the undominated strategies. In the Bertrand model of competition between two pricesetting …rms, for example, the unique Nash equilibrium is for both …rms to announce price equal to marginal cost -a strategy weakly dominated for both …rms yet uncovered, suggesting that the inclusion results of Section 4 may be more general than stated there.
We now generalize the proof of Theorem 2 in a sequence of steps (for simplicity, considering only the …rst part of the theorem), relying on the original proof for our arguments:
Assume X is second countable, (X; u 1 ; u 2 ) is symmetric with continuous payo¤s and interchangeable equilibria. If (¾; ¾ 0 ) is a Nash equilibrium, then ¾(U ) = ¾ 0 (U ) = 1.
We can easily drop the assumption of interchangeability by restating the result for symmetric equilibria:
Assume X is second countable and (X; u 1 ; u 2 ) is symmetric with continuous payo¤s. If (¾; ¾) is a Nash equilibrium, then ¾(U ) = 1.
Furthermore, we can relax the symmetry requirement, de…ning covering as above but with the interpretation of "covering for player 1." Letting U 1 denote the set of strategies uncovered for player 1, the following extension is straightforward:
If X is second countable, u 1 is continuous, and (¾; ¾) is a Nash equilibrium, then ¾(U 1 ) = 1. If X is second countable, u 1 is continuous, and (¾; ¾ 0 ) is a mutually absolutely continuous Nash equilibrium, then ¾(U 1 ) = 1.
Finally, for an n-player game (X; u 1 ; : : : ; u n ), de…ne x to cover y for player i if u i (x; y; : : : ; y) > u i (y; : : : ; y) and xDy. The reader can check that the proof of Theorem 2 is easily modi…ed to support our last generalization of the theorem:
If X is second countable, u 1 is continuous, and (¾ 1 ; : : : ; ¾ n ) is a mutually absolutely continuous Nash equilibrium, then ¾ 1 (U 1 ) = 1.
Unfortunately, Theorem 4 is not so easily generalized, because equality (4) relies on the symmetric, zero-sum structure of the game. The example of the Bertrand model suggests that it does generalize, but we leave this question open. set B µ W £ E, endowed with the product ¾-algebra, such that Y is the projection of B. Every measurable subset of W is analytic, but there are some analytic sets that are not measurable. A set Y is coanalytic if it is the complement of an analytic set. Analyticity is preserved by countable intersections and unions, but not complementation. Thus, coanalytic sets may not be analytic.
The analytic sets are close to measurable, however. If Y is analytic then, for any probability measure ¹ on (W; -), there are measurable sets S and R such that S µ Y µ R and ¹(S) = ¹(R).
A function f: X ! < is analytic if, for all c, fx 2 X j f(x) > rg is analytic; equivalently, if, for all c, fx 2 X j f(x)¸rg is analytic.
An important virtue of analytic sets is the following. Let S be a complete, separable metric space (and, therefore, a Souslin space), and let A be an analytic subset of S £ W . Then the projection of A onto W is analytic. In contrast, we can say nothing about the projection of coanalytic sets.
See Dellacherie and Meyer (1978) for a complete treatment of analytic sets and functions, or see Stinchcombe and White (1992) for a good survey. Lemma 1.
1. If X is a complete, separable metric space, then graphC is coanalytic.
2. If u is continuous, then graphC is measurable. If, in addition, X is a complete, separable metric space, then V is analytic.
3. If X is a compact metric space and u is continuous, then V (and therefore U ) is measurable.
Proof. 1. De…ne f: X £X £X ! < by f(x; y; z) = u(x; z)¡u(y; z). Because u is measurable, f is measurable with respect to the product ¾-algebra on X £ X £ X. De…ne f ¤ : X £ X ! < by f ¤ (x; y) = sup z2X f(x; y; z). By Stinchcombe and White's (1992) Theorem 2.17, f ¤ is analytic, and it follows that f(x; y) 2 X £ X j f ¤ (x; y) > 0g is an analytic set. Noting that graphC is the complement of f(x; y) 2 X £ X j u(x; y)¸0g [ f(x; y) 2 X £ X j f ¤ (x; y) > 0g;
an analytic set, we see that graphC is coanalytic. 2. If u is continuous, then f is also. Note that f(x; y) 2 X £ X j f ¤ (x; y) > 0g is the projection of the open set f(x; y; z) 2 X £ X £ X j f(x; y; z) > 0g; and is therefore itself open. Then graphC is the complement of a measurable set, as above, and, therefore, measurable. The set V is the projection of graphC, and, if X is a complete, separable metric space, V is therefore analytic.
3. Now add the assumption that X is compact. By the theorem of the maximum, f ¤ is continuous, implying that f(x; y) 2 X £X j f ¤ (x; y)¸0g is closed. Then, from the above analysis, each section C(x) is the intersection of an open set and a closed set, and thus C(x) can be written as the countable union of compact subsets of X. Using Stinchcombe and White's (1992) Fact 2.2, as in the proof of their Example 2.12, it follows that V = proj x graphC is measurable. (See also Larman (1973) , Corollary to Theorem 1.) Then, of course, U = X n V is measurable as well. 
